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THE RESTORATION OF IN RE WINSHIP: A
COMMENT ON BURDENS OF PERSUASION
IN CRIMINAL CASES AFTER
PATTERSON v. NEW YORK
Ronald J. Allen*

I.

FROM

Winship

TO

Patterson

At the conclusion of its last term, the Supreme Court rendered
what should have been a most unremarkable decision. In Patterson
v. New York,1 -the Court upheld New York's affirmative defense of
extreme emotional disturbance, 2 which requires a defendant who
seeks to reduce his offense from murder to manslaughter to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted under extreme
emotional disturbance. 3 Had the case come before the Court seven
years earlier, it could have been swiftly dispatched with a brief
opinion upholding the New York statute on the grounds that the issue
of extreme emotional disturbance does not arise until the state proves
beyond a reasonable doubt the "essential elements" of the crimeintent and causation4-and that "extreme emotional disturbance" is
but a slightly modified version of the defense of provocation, for
which many states had long placed the burden of proof upon the
defendant. 5

* Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.S. 1970, Marshall University; J.D. 1973, The University of Michigan.
1. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 125.15(1)(a) (McKinney 1975). In New York, when an
"affirmative defense" is raised at trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing
it by a preponderance of the evidence. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00(2) (McKinney
1975).
3. In this Article, the phrase "affirmative defense" refers to a fact for which the
defendant bears the burden of persuasion and that, if proved, reduces the severity of
an offense. Similarly, the phrase "burden of proor• and its derivatives will refer
solely to the burden of persuasion. For the distinction between the burden of persuasion and the burden of production, see McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF TilE LAW OF
EVIDENCE§ 336 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
4. N.Y. PENALLAw § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1975).
5. See Rhay v. Browder, 342 F.2d 345, 349 (1965) ("We know of no case that
holds that a defendant is deprived of due process by a rule . . . that shifts to a defendant either the burden of going forward or the burden of proof as to an issue
brought into the case as an element of the defense when the state has made out a
prima facie case.").
New York adopted its affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance from
30
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Unfortunately, two intervening Supreme Court opinions precluded such summary treatment and made what should have been
a most unremarkable decision quite r1/markable indeed. The first
is Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in In re Winship, 6 which
held that adjudications of juvenile delinquency must employ the
reasonable doubt standard. Justice Brennan could have reached this
result without disturbing the conventional understanding of affirmative defenses. Instead, he provided the impetus for the Court's
foray into this area by enthusiastically embracing at the conclusion
of the first part of his opinion the reasonable doubt standard as a
constitutional requirement: "Lest there remain any doubt," Justice
Brennan wrote, "we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged." 7
Clearly, this assertion did not express the holding of Winship,
at least not according to any traditional meaning of "holding." 8 Indeed, Winship was largely viewed as confirming the existing state
of affairs 9-a state of affairs in which every jurisdiction employed
the reasonable doubt standard in criminal adjudications, with- only
those exceptions explicitly provided for by statute or the common
law. 10 Yet that understanding of Winship was seemingly disapthe MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3(b). The Code drafters conceived of extreme emotional disturbance as broader than the traditional concept of provocation. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 201.3,(b), Comment l (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The Code, however, does not put the burden of persuasion on the defendant.
6. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
7. 397 U.S. at 364. Earlier in the opinion, 397 U.S. at 363, Brennan quoted a
similar assertion from Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895): "No man
should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try him
are able, upon their consciences, to say that the evidence before them . • . is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged." Later courts, however, interpreted Davis as not establishing a constitutional rule. See note 36 infra.
8. Winship did not present the question whether "every fact necessary to constitute the crime" need be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and resolution of this issue was not essential to the Court's decision. The case raised the question whether a
"conviction" could be obtained upon proof only by a preponderance of the evidence.
See 397 U.S. at 359. Winship and the distinction between these two questions are
discussed in section II infra.
I am assuming that Justice Brennan's statement did not mean to endorse the "elements test." See text at notes 70-74 infra.
9. See Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEXAS L.
REv. 269, 270 n.10 (1977).
10. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable ,Doubt
Rule, 55 B.U.L. REv. 507, 519-27 (1975). See also Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal
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proved in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 11 the second case that preceded the
surprising decision in Patterson.
In Mullaney, the Court, speaking through Justice Powell,
invoked Winship to strike down Maine's affirmative defense of provocation12 on the ground that requiring the defendant to prove
provocation by a preponderance of the evidence violated Winship's
requirement that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every
fact necessary to constitute the crime." Since Maine had chosen to
distinguish p:mrder from manslaughter on the basis of provocation,
said Justice Powell, absence of provocation is a necessary element
of murder, and, consequently, the state must prove it beyond reasonable doubt once the issue is properly raised. 13
The most striking aspect of Justice Powell's opinion in Mullaney
was its rejection of Maine's statutory classifications, a rejection all
the more remarkable since it involved a traditional affirmative defense. By looking beyond the "form" of a statutory scheme and concentrating on its "substance" to determine what facts constituted the
crime,14 Justice Powell's opinion seemed to provide the low~r federal
courts with yet another portal for intervening into areas generally
thought to be the primary concern of the states. To make matters
worse, Justice Powell provided no easily recognizable limits to ·this
newly discovered power to meddle with the burden of proof in state
criminal cases, for although the holding of the case was clear enough
Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases,
77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968).
11. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The history of the Mullaney litigation is detailed in
Comment, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of Malice ill
Maine, 54 B.U.L. REV. 973 (1974).
12. Maine courts have not referred to provocation as an affirmative defense, but
there is little doubt about its nature. See text at notes 94-100 infra.
In Mullaney, the defendant Wilbur claimed to have been provoked by the victim's
homosexual advance upon him. 421 U.S. at 685.
13. 421 U.S. at 703-04. The penultimate sentence in the Court's opinion in•
tiniates that the state may require the defendant to raise the issue of provocation. 421
U.S. at 704.
14. 421 U.S. at 698-99. Reference to Maine's statutory treatment of homicide
or provocation refers to the Maine statutes as interpreted by the Maine courts. The
defendant in Mullaney was convicted under MB. REv. STAT, tit. 17, § 2651 (1965),
which provided: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought,
either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment
for life." The manslaughter statute, MB. REV. SrAT. tit. 17, § 2551 (1965), read
in relevant part: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion,
on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought . . • shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than
20 years . . . ."
'
The Maine cases construing these statutes are discussed in Comment, Due ProcesJ
and Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of Federalism
After Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 ME. L. REv. 37 (1974),
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-"the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden
provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide
case" 15-just how Justice Powell reached that conclusion was not. 16
At first blush Justice Powell's theory does seem clear enough:
placing the burden of proof of an affirmative defense on the defendant undermines the interests protected by Winship's requirement of
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 17 But Justice Powell- failed
to explain why Winship is not satisfied if the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt the factual issues raised by the relevant statute or case law where these facts alone sustain a conviction for the
more serious offense. He failed, in short, -to construct a bridge from
the interests noted in Winship to the issue presented by Mullaney.
Similarly, the significance of his brief overview of the history of
provocation in the law of homicide is elusive. 18 One can read this
portion of the opinion, as he later did read it in his dissenting opinion
in Patterson, as an effort to qualify the Winship rule by limiting it
to those factors that historically have "made a substantial difference
in punishment of the offender and in the stigma associated with the
conviction."10 Yet, just why history is so crucial to the constitutionality of an affirmative defense is left unsaid. 20
15. 421 U.S. at 704.
16. For example, compare Allen, supra note 9, with Tushnet, Constitutional
Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REV. 775 (1975), and Comment, Unburdening the
Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 390 (1976).
17. 421 U.S. at 698.
18. Justice Powell asserted that "[o]ur analysis may be illuminated if this issue
[whether the Maine rule requiring the defendant to prove that he was provoked accords with due process] is placed in historical context." 421 U.S. at 692. According
to Justice Powell, review of the treatment of provocation in the law of homicide "establishes two important points":
First, . . . the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation
. . . has been, almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, the
single most important factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching
to an unlawful homicide. And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving this fact.
421 U.S. at 696. Yet, Justice Powell does not return to this review later in the opinion.
19. 432 U.S. at 226.
20. Justice Powell's position-set forth clearly in his dissenting opinion in Patterson, see 432 U.S. at 216-32-that states should be required to prove beyond reason•
able doubt only those factors that make, and have historically made, a significant
difference in punishment and stigma is difficult to justify. Even if his first proposition is accepted, what is there that makes historical analysis-his second proposition-assume such importance? If a state could constitutionally disregard a factor
that long has made "a substantial difference in punishment and stigma," as he apparently assumes it could, .then why is the middle ground-shifting the burden-im-
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Notwithstanding Justice Powell's belated attempt in his dissent
in Patterson to remedy some of the inadequacies of his opinion in
Mullaney, the earlier case had clearly appeared to herald the end
of affirmative defenses in the criminal law. For all its ambiguous
reasoning, Mullaney did suggest that the basic constitutional defect
of Maine's statutory scheme was that it drew a distinction between
murder and manslaughter "while refusing to require the prosecution
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which it
turns." 21 And if Mullaney rested on the principle that the state may
not distinguish between offenses without requiring the prosecution
to "establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which [the
distinction] turns," then it is difficult to see how any affirmative defense could survive Mullaney. If the defendant could not be required to "establish" ,the "distinction" between murder and manslaughter, how could the state require him, for example, to establish
the equally important distinction between an act done with or without justification, 22 or the distinction between armed robbery with or
without a loaded gun, 23 or the distinction between an act done while
legally sane or insane? 24
permissible? Moreover, why does the Constitution, as Justice Powell suggested, dis•
tinguish between factors substantially affecting punishment of ancient and recent
origin? Why is a defendant treated unfairly if a state provides for the affirmative
defense of provocation, which may significantly mitigate punishment, but is treated
fairly if a state provides for the affirmative defense of ignorance of fact to a rape
prosecution, see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 1130.10, .35 (McKinney 1975); WASH.
REv. C.ODE ANN. § 9.79.160(2) (1977), that may have just as great an impact?
Justice Powell provided no answers to these questions.
In fact, I have barely scratched the surface of the problems found in Justice
Powell's dissenting opinion in Patterson. One could reasonably inquire, for example,
why the dissenters would rely on history to determine those factors that are within
their analysis but not look to history to see where the burden of proof for those
factors has traditionally been placed. One could also point out possible inconsisten•
cies--such as the assertion that Winship and Mullaney involved only procedure and
not substance, which is followed by the statement that those cases forbid a state "to
mask substantive policy choices by shifts in the burden of persuasion." 432 U.S.
at 228 n.13. One might also ask what difference it makes to the Supreme Court
how a state makes those policy choices it is permitted to make, and what evidence
Justice Powell can marshal to support his unadorned assertion that "[t]he political
check on potentially harsh legislative action is . . . more likely to operate" if his view
is embraced. 432 U.S. at 228 n.13. Finally, one might decry the willingness to mis•
read cases in order to support the argument. See the discussion of United States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), in 432 U.S. at 228 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
21. 421 U.S. at 698.
22. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.00(1) (McKinney 1975).
23. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 160.15 (McKinney 1975), upheld in People v.
Felder, 39 App. Div. 2d 373, 334 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1972), affd., 32 N.Y.2d 747, 297
N.E.2d 522,344 N.Y.S.2d 643, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 948 (1973).
24. See, e.g., DE+. CODE tit. 11, §§ 304, 401 (1975), upheld in Rivera v. State,
- Del.-, 351 A.2d 561, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
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The wide-ranging potential of Mullaney's reading of Winship
was quickly seen by commentators25 and courts. 26 The commentators generally had difficulty seeing how Mullaney could, or why it
should, be contained, 27 and the courts, although commendably more
cautious in their applications of Mullaney to the specific facts before
them, began to invalidate various allocations of burdens of persuasion
to defendants. 28 The stage seemed set, in short, for the eventual
elimination of affirmative defenses from the criminal law. 29 But
then came Patterson v. New York. 30
Patterson involved the constitutionality of New York's homicide
scheme, which is functionally equivalent to the Maine provisions at
issue in Mullaney. 31 In light of the decisions in Mullaney and, to
25. Mullaney quickly generated an extensive commentary. In addition to the
works already cited in notes 9, 11, 14 & 16 supra, see Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 ARK. L. REv. 429 (1976);
Comment, Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses in the Texas Penal Code, 28
BAYLOR L. REV. 120 (1976); Comment, The Burden of Proof and the Insanity Defense After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 28 ME. L. REV. 435 (1977); Comment, Affirmative
Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 828 (1975); Note, The
New York Penal Law's Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 21 SYRACUSE
L. R.Ev. 834 (1976); Note, State v. Evans-A Frontal Attack on the Common Law
of Murder, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 95 (1976); Note, Buzynski v. Oliver: Allocation of
the Burden of Persuasion for the Insanity Defense, 63 VA. L. REV. 147 (1977). See
also Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for
Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1975), an excellent piece.
26. See, e.g., Grace v. Hopper, 425 F. Supp. 1355 (M:D. Ga. 1977); State v.
Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d 337, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977); cases cited in Allen, supra note
9, at 275 n.13.
21. But see Allen, supra note 9; Tushnet, supra note 16.
28. For decisions invalidating affirmative defenses, see cases cited in note 26
supra. For examples of commendable caution, see Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976) (upholding affirmative defense of insanity); Rodriguez v. Smith, 428 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (upholding affirmative defense of renunciation of attempted crime). For two recent burden of persuasion cases written after Patterson that rest on statutory or common-law grounds,
see Batson v. State, 568 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1977); State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.
2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977).
29. With the possible exception of insanity. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704-06
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
30. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
31. Patterson was convicted under N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1975),
which provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
•1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this
subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse . • ••
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1975) provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:

2.'

\vith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not con-
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a lesser extent, in Winship, Patterson should have been a simple per
curiam reversal of the New York Court of Appeals' decision sustaining the statute. Instead, the Supreme Court upheld the New York
statute, with Justice White writing an opinion for the majority that
reads, for the most part, as though Mullaney had never occurred.
To confuse matters further, when Justice White finally turned his
attention to Mullaney he attempted to distinguish rather than overrule it, even though the earlier portions of his opinion point .quite
clearly in the opposite direction. 32
Thus, we are now in the rather interesting position of having two
Supreme Court decisions written within two years of on~ another on
functionally identical statutes, one striking down and the other upholding the statutory scheme. Needless to say, this creates some uncertainty as to what "the law" is in this area. In this Article I intend
to analyze that uncertainty and provide a coherent theory that justifies as well as llinits the federal interest in the reasonable doubt standard. 33 In support of this effort I will also examine Patterson's attempt to distinguish Mullaney, for I think that attempt may yield some
insights into the Court's view of the relationship between affirmative defenses and presumptions in the criminal law. 34

Il.

THE FEDERAL INTEREST ·IN THE REASONABLE
THE "RESTORATION" OF Winship

DoUBT STANDARD:

In his dissent in Patterson, Justice Powell accused the Court of
"drain[ingl In re Winship . . . of much of its .vitality."35 Justice
Powell was wrong. Patterson did not "drain Winship of its vitality";
stitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25.
The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to
manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution
initiated under this subdivision.
Patterson claimed to have been provoked upon seeing his estranged wife in a "state
of semiundress" in the presence of the victim. 432 U.S. at 198.
The congruence between the Maine and New York statutes is noted in Patterson,
432 U.S. at 220, 227, and Osenbaugh, supra note 25, at 447-48.
32. See section III infra. The New York Court of Appeals' distinction between
Mullaney and Patterson rested on a misunderstanding of Maine law. The New York
court believed that Maine, unlike New York, did not requir~ the state to prove intent. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 313, 347 N.E.2d 898, 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d
573, 582 (1976). See Allen, supra note 9, at 300 n.145.
33. See section II infra. I will not discuss burdens of proof of preliminarY questions of fact. For such a discussion, see generally Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 21 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975).
34. See section III infra.
35. 432 U.S. at 216.
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rather, it rejected Mullaney's extension of Winship beyond the
latter's legitimate boundaries, and thus it restored Winship to its original purpose. Careful examination of these three cases shows not
only that Patterson rightly rejected the due process analysis employed
in Mullaney, but also indicates the proper scope of the federal interest in the reasonable doubt standard.
Winship was the first Supreme Court decision to hold explicitly
that the reasonable doubt standard possesses constitutional dimensions. 36 Since no state had ever allowed criminal conviction on less
than proof beyond reasonable doubt, 37 with a qualified exception for
affirmative defenses, 38 the Court had never been called upon to impose the reasonable doubt standard as a constitutional mandate. 30
l~deed, Winship itself was not a criminal case but a juvenile delinquency proceeding, and the Court's discussion of the role of the
reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases was simply pre1iminary
to its application of the ruling of In re (_Jault, 40 which provided that
the states must observe in juvenile delinquency proceedings certain
elements of due process associated with criminal trials. The Court
concluded that the reasonable doubt standard was one of the procedures required in both settings, and thus New York's blanket use
of a lesser standard of proof could not stand. 41
The Court reached its conclusion in Winship concerning the due
36. On several occasions, the Court has expressed in dictum that the Constitution
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. See cases cited in Winship, 397 U.S. at 362. The- one case prior to Winship that might have been read
as holding that the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt is Davis
v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), in which the Court stated that the prosecution
in a criminal case must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane
when he committed the offense. Davis involved a federal prosecution, and the decision was generally regarded as applying only to federal criminal procedure. See, e.g.,
People v. Allender, 117 Cal. 81, 48 P. 1014 .(1897). In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S.
790, 797' (1952), the Supreme Court peremptorily concluded that Davis "obviously
establishes no constitutional doctrine, but only the rule to be followed in federal
courts," and upheld the constitutionality of state statutes requiring the defendant to
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court in Davis cited no constitutional or statutory authority for its position,
but did draw sustenance from the practice of seven states and the District of Columbia. 160 U.S. at 488-92. The Court appears to have reasoned that, as a matter of
general principle, mental capacity is an element of murder, if not all criminal offenses, and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "the existence of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged." 160 U.S. at 488, 493. Presumably, Davis is now to be regarded as an exercise of the Court's supervisory
authority over federal courts. See Leland, 343 U.S. at 798-99.
37. See generally Morano, supra note 10.
38. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 882-83.
39. 397 u.s; at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. 397 U.S. at 368.
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process attributes of the reasonable doubt standard by noting that
the universal acceptance of that standard42 strongly implied its fundamental nature or, to put the matter more precisely, strongly implied the necessity of employing the reasonable doubt standard to
protect a fundamental value. The value protected, as Justice Harlan
so cogently demonstrated in his concurrence, is the policy of preferring errors benefiting the accused over those favoring the prosecution. The Court then supplemented its analysis by articulating the
interests that this value preference protects-principally the accused's interest in liberty and his good name-in order to demonstrate that they were of sufficient magnitude to justify including the
procedure safeguarding them among the elements of due process. 43
In the second part of its opinion, the Court dealt with the state's argument that juvenile proceedings are civil rather than criminal in
nature. The Court rejected this contention, and its reasoning is
critical to a proper understanding of Winship. The Court simply was
not convinced that juvenile delinquency proceedings could be distinguished meaningfully from criminal proceedings, at least not in any
way relevant to burdens of proof, 44 and thus it quite sensibly refused
to allow due process adjudication to be controlled by labels. Accordingly, the states were forbidden from withdrawing a procedure
that admittedly served values and interests of constitutional dimension from a hearing in which those interests were at stake in a fashion
hardly distinguishable from a criminal trial, even though New York
was :qot the only state where juvenile delinquency trials masqueraded
as "civil proceedings."45
42. 397 U.S. at 361-63.
43. 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). The majority did recognize that
the reasonable doubt standard implements the policy of minimizing the risk of erroneous convictions. 397 U.S. at 362-63.
Obviously, the extent of the historical or the present-day commitment to a practice does not necessarily control due process analysis. Some procedures, such as seating the prosecution at the table farthest from the jury during trial, may be nearly
universal, but are hardly matters of due process. Conversely, some widespread procedures, such as use of a preponderance standard in juvenile delinquency proceedings,
violate due process. The paramount issues in due process analysis are the importance
of the value preserved by the procedure in the system of criminal justice and whether
the state has adequately protected the interests at stake. History and the practices
of other jurisdictions are, of course, quite relevant to these determinations and indeed
may often be the most influential criteria, as Patterson strongly suggests. One should
be cautious about inf~rring too much concerning due process adjudication from one
case, however. The discussion in the text, at any rate, is descriptive rather than eval•
uative.
44. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (jury trial not constitutionally required in juvenile proceedings).
45. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 n.22 (1967).
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The important point to note about the Winship Court's treatment
of burdens of proof in criminal cases is that the Court's due process
analysis relied heavily on the common practice in the states and only
supported the implications of that practice by reference to _the interests protected. The Court attempted no thorough examination of
those interests and did not purport to consider fully the states' burden-of-persuasion practices. Indeed, affirmative defenses were
never even mentioned by the Court. In Mullaney, by contrast, the
Court reversed its order of reasoning, concentrating first on the interests protected by the reasonable doubt standard rather than on
whether Maine's statute "offends some principle of justice so deeply
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." 46 _ This reversal of the analysis in Mullaney was
the cause of Patterson's subsequent disavowal of Mullaney, for it had
implications far beyond what Winship could support.
In Mullaney, the Court noted that the interests protected by the
reasonable doubt standard are implicated when a state chooses to
distinguish murder from manslaughter. That is true enough, but
what the Court failed to note was that these interests are. implicated
every time a state draws a distinction between offenses by the use
of an affirmative defense.47 Thus Mullaney, carried to its logical
extreme, would seem to forbid the use of all affirmative defenses.
Yet, consider once again the genesis of this analysis in Winship.
There the Court relied heavily on the existing state of the law in
order to demonstrate the constitutional interest in the reasonable
doubt standard. The existing state of the law, however, included
affirmative defenses. Thus, on the basis of Winship, states should
indeed be forbidden generally from employing the preponderance
standard in criminal cases, but, in light of the Court's analysis, should
they be allowed to employ affirmative defenses in that setting? The
answer is obviously yes; or if -that is not so obvious, the analytical
structure of Winship, as distinguished from Justice Brennan's dicta,
unmistakably provides no basis for the contrary conclusion.
One can now see more clearly the shift of analysis in Mullaney
that permitted it to accomplish a result that Winship could not sustain. Mullaney invoked Winship not to invalidate a burden-of-proof
practice demonstrably inconsistent with the "traditions and conscience of our people," but instead used that case in a fashion that
46. This is the standard Patterson purports to apply. See 432 U.S. at 201-02
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (11958) ).
47. Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970) (habitual offender status provable by preponderance of the evidence).
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would provide the means to invalidate a practice long accepted
throughout the country. Thus Mullaney, which purported to "apply"
Winship, drastically altered that case from one that looks to traditional practice and prevailing usage by the states to aid in due
process analysis to one that frees the federal courts to impose their
own view about the appropriate use of the reasonable doubt standard
on the states notwithstanding widely shared views to the contrary.
Moreover, this result was apparently to be allowed even though two
crucial aspects of Winship_ were absent-the states had not eviscerated the prosecution's burden such that "innocents" were not protected against erroneous convictions, and there had been no attempt
to subjugate analysis to the facade of a labeling process. It is this
overextension of Winship by Mullaney that the Court clearly wished
to condemn in Patterson:
Long before Winship, the universal rule in this country was
that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
At the same time, the long-accepted rule was that it was constitutionally permissible to provide that various affirmative defenses
were to be proved by the defendant. This did not lead to such
abuses or to such widespread redefinition of crime and reduction of
the ·prosecution's burden that a new constitutional rule was required. This was not the problem to which Winship was addressed.48

Thus, one significant aspect of Patterson is, in short, the restoration
of Winship to its original purpose and the concomitant refusal to permit Winship to be misconstrued and then employed as the basis for
unjustifiable extensions of federal authority. 49
Merely noting the effect of Patterson is inadequate for my
purposes, - however, for quite possibly the erroneous decision is
Patterson rather than Mullaney. This possibility is made evident by
reconsidering what it means to protect "innocent" defendants by the
reasonable doubt standard. I asserted above that affirmative defenses do not enhance the likelihood of erroneous convictions since the
prosecution must meet its burden for the designated elements of the
crime before an affirmative defense ever becomes relevant. Yet
what does it mean to protect against "erroneous convictions"? If
it means simply that the prosecution must establish enough to justify
48. 432 U.S. at 211 (footnote omitted).
49. Interestingly, the trend in the states has been toward making lack of provocation an element of the prosecution's case. 432 U.S. at 211. The Court could
have emphasized this fact in order to uphold the result in Mullaney, That it did
not do so indicates to me that the Court's primary concern was disavowing Mullaney's general thrust.
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a conviction, then my assertion is indisputable. If, on the other
hand, it means that the prosecution must establish each fact that
bears on an accused's culpability or sentence, then my assertion is
in error. Whenever a defendant fails to establish an affirmative defense, the possibility is presented that, had the prosecution been required to disprove the defense beyond reasonable doubt, the trier
of fact would have either convicted the defendant of a lesser offense
or acquitted altogether. This would result, of course, in exposing
the defendant to a lesser punishment or no punishment at all. Affirmative defenses, in short, undeniably affect the interests articulated in Winship. Thus, to determine which case--Patterson or
Mullaney-was decided correctly, the analysis must proceed to an
examination of the interests thought to be protected by the reasonable doubt standard. That examination will demonstrate, I think,
that the interests articulated in Winship and employed in Mullaney
cannot reasonably justify the implications of the latter case, although
those interests, as implicitly accommodated in Patterson, do indicate
the extent of the federal interest in the reasonable doubt standard.
Winship amculated three interests that the reasonable doubt
standard tends to protect-the community's confidence in the
criminal law, the defendant's interest in avoiding unwarranted stigmatization, and his interest in being free from unjustified loss of liberty. 50 This list has apparently been considerably shortened by Patterson. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Patterson made any
reference to the community confidence notion, presumably because
the Court now recognizes that insofar as this interest does more than
reiterate the defendant's interest in avoiding undeserved punishment, it is a concern of the states, not the federal government. 51
The matter of stigmatization, also omitted from the majority's
analysis, parallels the deprivation of liberty and hence does not require separate treatment. 52 In short, the interests informing due
50. 397 U.S. at 363-64. The Court mentioned that the reasonable doubt standard also protects against erroneous convictions, but the concern with error is due to
the presence of the interests mentioned in the text. It has no independent analytical
significance.
51. See Allen, supra note 9, at 279-81.
52. ld. at 281-83. In his dissent in Patterson, Justice Powell referred three times
to the defendant's interest in avoiding undeserved stigmatization, 432 U.S. at 226,
228, for the purpose of asserting that Mullaney proscribed only affirmative defenses
that result in a major difference in loss of liberty and stigmatization. Given the uncertainties in measuring stigmatization, it is questionable whether, in Justice Powell's
view, a difference in this variable alone would invalidate an affirmative defense.
Presumably, the stigma he had in mind is an intuitive notion of how much obloquy
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process analysis of the reasonable doubt standard under the Constitution can be reduced to the defendant's liberty interest. 58
Mullaney insisted that the determination of which of two related
offenses the defendant has committed affects his constitutional liberty interest no less than the judgment of guilt or innocence. 64 Undeniably, the presence or absence of the mitigating factor may have
a substantial impact on the severity of the punishment a convicted
defendant receives. As Mullaney pointed out, the added punishment may be more burdensome than the whole punishment imposed
for some lesser offenses. 65 Yet, one cannot jump from this fact io
the conclusion that requiring the prosecutor to prove the distinguishing factor beyond a reasonable doubt serves the due process interest. Assuming that the punishment for the higher offense is valid,
given what the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt,
the allocation of the persuasion burden of the mitigating factor has
no bearing on whether the defendant suffers what the Constitution
considers undeserved punishment. Thus, the interest served by the
due process requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is unaffected by thp outcome of cases like Mullaney.
An example may help to clarify this argument. Consider a state
with an intentional homicide statute that punishes every intentional
homicide with thirty-years' imprisonment; if the state proves that the
defendant intentionally killed the victim, then a flat sentence of
thirty years is imposed regardless of the presence of any mitigating
factor. Assume that such a statute is constitutional. Now, consider
the effect on the constitutionality of that statute of simply adding to
it a provision that no more than twenty years of imprisonment may
be imposed if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. If the constitutional interest in the reasonable doubt
standard centers on liberty deprivation, how can the addition of a
chance to mitigate a constitutional punishment invalidate the statute?
Or, to put it another way, if a state may constitutionally imprison
all intentional murderers for thirty years by proving beyond reasonable doubt only intent and causation, then whatever liberty interest
is associated with different offenses. See Allen, supra note 9, at 281-83; note 53
infra.
53. I am excluding the unlikely case where the only purpose of a criminal trial
is to stigmatize. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (reputation alone is not
"liberty" or "property" within the due process clause).
54. 421 U.S. at 698.
55. 421 U.S. at 698-.
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the defendant constitutionally possesses in the context of homicide
prosecutions surely is fully accommodated by such a statute. How,
then, can the addition of a mitigating circumstance in the form of
an affirmative defense-a factor that reduces punishment-possibly
violate the already fully accommodated interest? 56
Patterson appears on close inspection to have adopted this line
of reasoning, although how the Court in Patterson treated an accused's liberty interest is not, to say the least, without ambiguity.
Justice White's opinion alludes to several different arguments that
conceivably could be used to articulate the federal interest in the
reasonable doubt standard, but the opinion fails to elaborate upon
any of them. Only one of the Court's allusions makes sense,
however. 57 It is contained in the following passage of the opinion:
The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York
to the choice of abandoning [affirmative] defenses or undertaking
to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime which
otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment. 58
The key to this passage is the word "otherwise." What the Court
is saying, I think, is that if a state may "otherwise" impose a particular sentence on the basis of what the state has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then permitting a defendant to reduce the sentence he receives below the permissible level through proof of an
affirmative defense is constitutional. 59
If the Court now subscribes to this theory-sometimes referred
to as the theory that "the greater includes the lesser" 60-the analysis
56. See generally Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal
Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919. Note that if the thirty-year sentence
were changed to life, this hypothetical would represent the statutes at issue in Mullaney and Patterson.
57. Alternative conceptions of the constitutional standards applicable to affirmative defenses are discussed in text at notes 68-80 infra.
58. 432 U.S. at 207-08.
59. For a related discussion, see Allen, supra note 9, at 284-301.
60. One author has recently disputed the implications of ''the greater includes the
lesser" notion. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977). Professor Underwood does
not attempt to rebut the force of "the greater includes the lesser" with respect to punishment and stigma, perhaps in recognition of the difficulty of the task. Rather, her
Article attempts to articulate constitutional interests that override "the greater includes the lesser" thesis. See generally Allen, supra note 9, at 290.
Professor Underwood's argument is flawed in a number of respects. She maintains, for example, that an undifferentiated reasonable doubt rule is needed to offset
jury bias against defendants. Underwood, supra at 1306-07. Unfortunately, she presents no evidence that juries are biased, and the only authority she cites for that
proposition is Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1149-53 (1960), who does not even mention the
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possibility. In fact, Professor Goldstein points out that juries, "[b]y refusing to • , •
find defendants guilty, . • . succeeded in considerable part in forcing a redress of the
imbalance in favor of the state." Id. at 1152. That is hardly a ringing affirmation
of the point Professor Underwood was attempting to support. Professor Underwood
also ignores the many expressions of faith, apparently as well grounded as her lack
of faith, in the attempt by most juries to do their duty as instructed by the judge.
See, e.g., R. I..EMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1148
(1977). This is not to say, of course, that jurors are unaware of the very significant
probability that the accused before them is guilty. But it is to say that there is little
evidence to support Professor Underwood's position that juries do not generally de•
cide cases on the basis of the evidence adduced by objectively evaluating the evidence
and employing the relevant standard of proof as they understand it. Professor
Underwood's reliance on jury bias is, in short, clearly inadequate to justify the constitutional doctrine she espouses.
Professor Underwood's remaining argument on behalf of Mullaney suffers from
serious infirmities as well, for not only does she rely on unfounded empirical assertions, but also she fails to present a tenable rationale for her conclusion. In essence,
Professor Underwood argues that affirmative defenses are unconstitutional because
they "ten[d] to deny citizens the fair notice that is constitutionally required of the
criminal law." Underwood, supra at 1324. This purported obscurity of a shift in
the persuasion burden, Underwood argues, is dangerous on two accounts. First, an
unwary individual may engage in certain conduct, rightfully thinking it is legal, only
to discover that he cannot sustain a burden of persuasion on a factual issue distinguishing his conduct from related, illegal conduct. Had he known of the alloca~
tion of the burden of proof, the argument runs, he might not have engaged in the con•
duct notwithstanding its legality. Id. at 1324. Second, the affirmative defense may
enable the legislature to deceive the public about its substantive policy choices and
thereby avoid public scrutiny of its actions. Id. at 1318.
This position contains several questionable assumptions. For one, Underwood assumes that the public is generally less informed about procedural, as opposed to substantive, law. There may be some intuitive truth to this proposition. Cf. Fletcher,
Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices
in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 880-94 (1968) ("[t]he burden of persuasion has
proved to be a subtle, low-visibility tool for adjusting the interest of competing classes
of litigants"). Still, Underwood fails to document the crucial point-that there is
a significant differential in the public's understanding of substantive and procedural
rules-and she even acknowledges that "popular understanding of the substantive law
is notoriously deficient." Underwood, supra at 1324. Similarly, Professor Underwood's apparent belief that the citizenry would substantially modify its behavior to
accommodate burden of proof rules is, to say the least, hardly a self-evident proposition.
Professor Underwood further assumes that legislatures commonly employ affirmative defenses in order to "repeal" substantive rules inconspicuously. Id. at 13119. She
refers to no empirical support for this assumption; indeed, it is hard to imagine how
$ere could be such evidence. She downgrades the possibility that the legislature's'
adoption of an affirmative defense may reflect a compromise of legitimate differences of opinion about the wisdom of the defense or a willingness to extend a benefit
to the defendant without burdening the prosecutor.
Professor Underwood's unadorned empirical assertions are troubling, for nowhere
does she point to a specific constitutional provision or doctrine as the source of a
prohibition against affirmative defenses. Thus, her argument must stand or fall on
the strength of the assertion that affirmative defenses tend to deny citizens fair notice
of the criminal law. The public may take little note of procedural developments, but
in the absence of persuasive evidence that the public has a much sounder grasp of
substantive law, how can one claim that a constitutional prohibition of affirmative
defenses is justified in order to preserve public oversight of the criminal law and to
protect the populace from being misled concerning the content of the criminal law?
Such a demonstration, I might add, would be difficult to make. Professor Underwood's position is based primarily on her view that the substantive criminal law is
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of the constitutionality of an affirmative defense must proceed to .
another level. One must ask whether the greater punishment-the
punishment authorized in the event the defendant fails to establish
less subtle than burden of proof analysis and thus it is reasonable to assume that
the public will better understand the substantive criminal law. Id. at 1324. Although she is surely correct in some instances, I venture to say that the "subtleties
of rules of proof" are a whole lot less "subtle" than the law of theft in most jurisdictions, and even less subtle still than such arcane areas as mistake of law and fact
or causation. At any rate, due process provides some protection against deceptive
criminal legislation by requiring clarity in the definition of offenses. In the absence
of proved abuses, it is unclear why the Constitution should demand more.
Professor Underwood's concluding defensive argument against the "greater includes the lesser" principle-a parade of horribles-is no more persuasive than her
effort to derive a constitutional doctrine that affirmatively overrides the principle.
She contends that, if the states can exempt certain defenses from the reasonable doubt
rule, they can eliminate other procedural protections, such as the right to counsel, for that defense. Id. at 1329-30. This argument fundamentally misconceives
the "greater includes the lesser" principle in the context of affirmative defenses.
This principle maintains simply that if the purpose of the reasonable doubt rule is
to protect a defendant's constitutional interest in liberty, the rule is satisfied if the
basic statute fully protects that constitutional interest. Accordingly, states should
then be permitted to allocate burdens of proof to defendants on factors that will mitigate punishment because the impact of the proof of the factor on the defendant's
liberty is not of constitutional magnitude-the constitutional interest has already been
secured. See also Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
·
Other procedural protections, such as the right to counsel, involve constitutional
interests other than liberty, however. The inability of the uninitiated to investigate,
to marshal and adduce evidence, to make effective presentations, and to work withip.
a complex procedural system give rise to a concern for rationality in the decisionmaking process that is independent of the accused's interests in liberty. Without the
aid of a trained advocate, the defendant may be unable to present his case in an effective manner. Consequently, the jury may be unable ·to appreciate the strength of the
defendant's case. or the weakness of the prosecution's and the rationality of its decisionmaking process may suffer accordingly. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458,465 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
Admittedly, we desire rational decisionmaking in part because the defendant's
liberty interests are at stake. Nonetheless, we also insist on rationality in order to
preserve the legitimacy of the criminal process as a means of enforcing social values.
Thus, we have a distinct interest in rationality, and procedures designed to further
that goal can easily be distinguished from burden-of-proof requirements. More important, however, even if we value rationality in a criminal proceeding solely for the
benefit of the defendant, we can _distinguish the burden of proof from other procedural safeguards. Burdens of proof do not enhance the rationality of the decisionmaking process. Rather, they simply allocate the risk of errors to one party or the
other. Thus, even if liberty interests underlie both the right to counsel and the reasonable doubt rule, the two protections are not necessarily coextensive. The right
to counsel can be seen as furthering a rational determination of whatever factual elements are present in a case, and the reasonable doubt standard can be seen as protecting an individual's eighth amendment liberty interests by placing the risk of error
on the prosecution for those factors necessary to justify the potential sentence. Analogous arguments can be constructed for each of the procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitution.
Finally, if we do not w~h to view the Constitution's procedural protections as
serving independent concerns from burdens of proof, then Professor· Underwood is
correct-states could limit those procedural protections to elements of the offense
made necessary by the eighth amendment.
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the affirmative defense-is constitutional. To answer that question,
one must tum to the eighth amendment.
Through most of the nineteenth century, the eighth amendment
was thought to forbid only rather hideous punishments, 61 but within
the last century the cruel and unusual punishment clause has been
interpreted to require a rough proportionality between· the culpabif.'.
ity of an offense and the punishment that is imposed. 62 This requirement of proportionality provides the method of testing the accuracy of the assumption found in my hypothetical, and it also provides the means of delineating the extent of the federal interest in
the reasonabl~ doubt standard. If the courts conclude that a given
punishment is not disproportional to what the state has proved beyond reasonable doubt63 notwithstanding the presence or absence of
any mitigating factors, then a defendant's liberty interest would obviously be satisfied by a statute that required proof of only those elements and that imposed that particular punishment. Accordingly,
the mere addition to that statute of an affirmative defense, which
after all could constitutionally be ignored, should be equally satisfactory. The import of the proportionality principle is, then, that the
state should be required to prove enough to justify the imposition
of .the maximum sentence permissible under the statute. 64 Once
that is accomplished, the accused has been fully protected against
an unwarranted deprivation of liberty, and the state should be permitted to elaborate on the basic statute as it sees fit.
61. See Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of
the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 838-45 (1972).
62. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). So far, Weems is the only
case in which the Supreme Court has applied the proportionality doctrine. Wheeler,
supra note 61, at 857-58. The doctrine has been applied by several lower federal
and state courts. See cases cited in Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Becarria, and
the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783, 832-33 (1975). See also
Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1975).
63. For example, in Mullaney the COurt could have ruled that life imprisonment
is too harsh a sentence for an intentional homicide when provocation is present.
Thus, the states would have had a choice between reducing the sentence for intentional
homicide and proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of provocation. Alternatively, the Court could have ruled, as in the death penalty cases, that life imprisonment for intentional homicide is too severe without consideration of some
aggravating and mitigating factors, whether or not provocation has constitutional
status. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976). The administration of the proportionality doctrine is discussed
in some detail in Allen, supra note 9, at 297-300.
64. In light of the Patterson decision, I suspect that federal courts will look at
the particular sentence given in a case rather than at the maximum sentence allowed
by the statute. This approach would result in fewer decisions invalidating a sentence.
Nevertheless, from a systemic perspective, it makes more sense to consider the maximum sentence. See Allen, supra note 9, at 299 n.143.
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The thesis that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt only with respect to those elements of the offense that are
"essential" by virtue of the eighth amendment concretely expresses
the role of the reasonable doubt standard. 65 It thus clarifies the
dimensions of the Constitution's solicitude for the "transcendent
value" of liberty-the ambiguous phrase often invoked in constitutional burden-of-proof adjudication as though it explained the result. 66 Together, due process and the eighth amendment protect
criminal defendants from unwarranted deprivations of liberty by
requiring the state to establish sufficient factual elements to justify
the allotted punishment and by requiring the state, in establishing
those elements, to minimize .the risk of error adverse to the defendant. Once the overriding constitutional command is satisfied,
however, the need for the protective procedure is likewise satisfied,
and the traditional state power should be able to reassert itself, permitting the states to allocate burdens of proof as they desire.
In addition to failing to provide cognizable constitutional standards, the unadorned rhetoric of "transcendent values" provides
little assurance that the results reached in cases invoking it are
constitutionally required. One of the compelling attributes of the
proportionality theory is that it cures this deficiency by tying the
federal constitutional mandate to a relatively unambiguous constitutional command that has the further advantage of leaving the
states substantially free to fashion their own policies. 67 Moreover,
65. There is widespread belief that employing the reasonable doubt standard makes
it more difficult to convict the factually innocent at the expense of making it more
difficult to convict the factually guilty. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368-72
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 SrAN. L REv. 1065 (1968). Whether the reasonable doubt standard actually
has this effect, however, is as of yet unproven. See the jury studies cited in Underwood, supra note 60, at 1308-11; see also C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE I..A.w
OF EVIDENCE 686 (1954). If, for example, there were no factually innocent defendants who, after all the evidence had been presented, would be within the gap between
the preponderance and the reasonable doubt standard, then requiring the prosecution
to meet the higher standard would serve solely to "protect" factually guilty people.
Even if my extreme example is not an accurate reflection of reality, which I doubt it
is, the basic point is nonetheless true. Without knowing the distribution of guilt probabilities of factually innocent and guilty defendants, we cannot know the actual effect of choosing one standard of proof over another. The problem is compounded,
of course, by our inability to make accurate estimates of the probability of guilt,
which explains the futility of attempting to define what a "reasonable doubt" is.
66. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
67. In this regard the proportionality. theory can profitably be compared to the
theory espoused in Underwood, supra note 60, which does not distinguish policy
from constitutional command and which permits-indeed, invites-the federal courts
to impose their view of wise policy on the states. This view of constitutional inter-
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it does so in such a way as to reconcile Winship and Patterson while
concomitantly demonstrating the errors of Mullaney. Winship, it is
now clear, merely articulated what a state must do if a factor is a
necessary elemep.t of the offense as defined by law. Patterson, by
contrast, provides the method to determine whether a state's definition of a crime is constitutionally permissible. Mullaney erred
in failing to inquire whether there are limits to thei federal concern in the accused's liberty and reputational interests and whether
the markedly different setting of Mullaney, as compared to Winship,
was of any constitutional significance. Patterson rectified these
errors, if it is viewed as embracing the proportionality concept, by
making clear that although the interests articulated in Winship are
of great importance, standing alone they are inadequate to prohibit
a state's allocation ·of the burden of proof that otherwise is constitutional. Patterson makes clear, in other words, to what extent the
factors present in. Winship but absent in Mullaney are relevant to
due process adjudication in this area and to what extent the accused's liberty and reputational interests are independently significant.
Relating crime to its punishment and viewing :the relationship
from the perspective of the eighth amendment provides, in sum, a
coherent theory that both justifies and delimits the federal interest
in the reasonable doubt standard. Morever, it does so in a way
far superior to other theories for federal intervention.
As Patterson indicated, there are two other principal theories of
the constitutional standards applicable to affirmative defenses that
compete with the ,proportionality theory----the "elements" theory and
the "political compromise" theory. 68 The "elements" theory stipulates that the state must prove beyond reasonable doubt whatever
factual issues it labels an element of the offense. A component of
this theory is the "physicaj. location" rule, a rule of statutory construction providing that a particular factual issue is an element of an offense only if it is incorporated into the text of the basic statute describing the offense. 00
pretation probably explains Professor Underwood's failure to examine carefully
whether an analysis that ties the burden of persuasion to the Constitution's relevant
s~bstantive command-the eighth amendment-is more acceptable than concluding
that the federal courts are justified in imposing an undifferentiated reasonable doubt
requirement on the states in the absence of an explicit constitutional provision mandating that result.
. 68. For a consideration of possible explanations of Mullaney v. Wilbur that are
mdependent of Patterson, see Allen, supra note 9, and authorities cited therein.
69. See Osenbaugh, supra note 25, at 437-42. Occasionally a court would em-
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At various points throughout the Patterson opinion the Court
alluded to the elements test, most explicitly in the statement
that the Court "will not disturb the balance struck in previous
cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution.
to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements included in
the definition. of the offense of which the defendant is charged." 70
Both examples given by the Court of unconstitutional burden shifts
also tend to support this view. They are situations in which no elements are included within the definition of the "crime," 71 which may
suggest that any affirmative defense will be sustained so long as the
legislature does not drain all substantive content from a crime's
definition.
Nevertheless, I doubt that the Court meant to embrace the
elements test as its criterion. of constitutionality. In the first place,
the sentence quoted above that alluded to the elements test was followed by another that implicitly rejected the test: "Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally
required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this
case and apply it to the statutory defense at issue here." 72 The
juxtaposition. of these two sentences would have been unnecessary
if the elements test were to control decision.making. Thus, the
necessary inference is that there may be "some affirmative defenses," but not "all," whose nonexistence the state will constitutionally
be required to prove.
More fundamentally, however, it is difficult to see just what conhellish the physical location rule in the following manner:
In the absence of a statute, the general rule is that the burden is upon the
state in a criminal case to negative any exception or proviso appearing in that
part of the statute which defines the crime if the exception is "so incorporated
with the language describing and defining the offense that the ingredients of
the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described if the exception is
omitted . . . ." 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indictments and Informations, § 98, pp.
940-941.
State v. Segovia, 93 Idaho 208, 210, 457 P.2d 905, 907 (1969). The embellishment
is of no analytical value, however. Consider 'a circle divided into three parts. If
one of the parts is removed, can the circle "be accurately and clearly described" without reference to the missing part? It depends on how you look at it, obviously( The
embellishment, in short, is just another means of .expressing the conclusion that a
particular factual requirement is or is not an element of an offense..
Julius Stone has effectively disposed of any lingering questions concerning the
logical significance of the physical location rule. See J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND
LAWYERS' REAsONINGS 241-43 (1964).
70. 432 U.S. at 210. See 432 U.S. at 205-06, 211 n.12, 215.
71. The Court noted that the legislature cannot declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty, nor can it declare that the finding of an indictment or proof of
the identity of the accused shall create a presumption of the existence of all the facts
essential to guilt. 432 U.S. at 210.
72. 432 U.S. at 210.
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stitutional interest is served by the elements theory. The physical
location rule is obviously an arbitrary means of determining the
"definition" of an offense. The legislature may wish to "define" an
offense in one way but define the elements of the prosecution's case
in another, and either could be considered the "definition" of the
crime. Why should the validity of a state statute placing the burden
of proving provocation on the defendant depend on whether the state
"defines" murder as intent, causation, and no provocation or simply
as intent and causation? 73 Surely Patterson's references to the elements theory were intended simply to indicate that the elements as
defined in the statute under review permitted the state to provide
for the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. 74
The second alternative standard that has been proposed for judging the validity of an · affirmative defense, while somewhat more
sophisticated than the elements theory, is no more persuasive. This
is the "political compromise" test, which permits affirmative defenses
that result from the compromise of competing forces in the legislature. 75 This test responds to the fear that states may be unwilling
to provide certain affirmative defenses if they cannot place on the
defendant the burden of proof for the factual issue created. Commentators have often pointed out that a decision like Mullaney, if
followed, would be likely to inhibit experimentation with new af73. The analysis would, of course, be the same if the burden were allocated by
judicial decision.
The existence of an explicit state statute placing the burden of persuasion on the
defendant would end the question in most states-the statute would be followed. See,
e.g., State v. Segovia, 93 Idaho 208, 457 P.2d 905 (1969).
74. The application of the elements theory must be distinguished from statutory
construction. A federal court may construe a federal statute as expressing Congress'
desire to require the prosecutor to bear the burden of persuasion on a particular factual issue. Thus, the court could invalidate a shift or reduction in the burden on
statutory gymnds. Cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 ·(1943), rejecting the Government's contention that a criminal conviction obtained with the use of an invalid
statutory presumption could be sustained on the ground that Congress had the power
to broaden the definition of the crime, thereby eliminating the need for the presump•
tion. The Court ruled that Congress had plainly chosen to condition a violation of
the statute on the existence of the inferred fact. For a similar exercise of statutory
construction, see United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
15. See MODEL PENAL CODE,§ 1.13, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 11955) at
113; 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING
PAPERS 19-24 (1970); W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 49
(1972),
The Court's language iq. Patterson did not rely directly on the political compromise
idea. Given the great scrutiny to which Patterson surely will soon be subjected, however, I think it useful to read bits and snatches of the opinion for all they are worth.
In this regard, note the Court's discussion of the possible policy decisions made by the
New York legislature regarding the recognition and burden of proof of the affirmative
defense of extreme emotional disturbance. See 432 U.S. at 207.
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firmative defenses. 76 To avoid that harsh irony, the political compromise test looks to whether the legislature would have refused to
adopt the defense but for the provision imposing the burden of proof
on the defendant.
Of this theory's many problems, the most disturbing is its paradoxical quality. It is paradoxical in the sense that if the only justification for allowing affirmative defenses is that otherwise the legislature will be forced to choose between two diametrically opposed but
constitutional alternatives, then the argument implicitly assumes the
unconstitutionality of affirmative defenses. Is not the real point, in
other words, that affirmative defenses are unconstitutional but that
such a conclusion may result in an unfortunate legislative choice, and
thus the better tack is to permit an unconstitutional choice as an expedient? Moreover, the only escape from this logical trap is either
to assert that political compromise is merely a general consideration
supporting the validity of affirmative defenses, in which case it provides no means of distinguishing the permissible from the impermissible defense, or to fashion criteria distinguishing •permissible from
impermissible grounds of compromise. The latter course presents
significant difficulties, the most serious of which is that it would require that the constitutional basis be articulated for whatever ground
of compromise is thought to be impermissible, and unfortunately
none of the reasons thought adequate to justify entering the murky
waters of legislative motivation are present in this context. 77
The difficulty of constructing from the elements or the political
compromise theory a coherent basis for constitutional analysis of affirmative defenses bolsters the conclusion that the Court has adopted
the eighth amendment proportionality doctrine. 78 Further evidence
that Patterson achieves this result may lie in the observation that the
proportionality doctrine can be administered consistently with the
practice of the Court in recent years of limiting intrusion by the federal judiciary into policy areas traditionally reserved for the states.
Consider once again the passage quoted at the beginning of this
section:
76. See the sources cited in note 75 supra. Each of these authorities incorporates,
to varying degrees, considerations of comparative convenience. See note 78 infra.
77. See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. Cr. REV. 95; Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 36 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970).
78. The Court in Patterson did not invoke considerations of comparative convenience-i.e., whether the state or the defendant could more conveniently bear the
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The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York to
the choice of abandoning [affirmative] defenses or undertaking to
disprove their' existence in order to convict of a crime which
otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment. 79

Perhaps the last phrase of this quote is a signal to the lower courts
t}lat they are not to accomplish through applications of the propor~
tionality principle what they were beginning to accomplish through
applications of Mullaney v. Wilbur. Having quite curtly disavowed
the far-flung implications of Mullaney, the Court surely did not mean
to substitute an equally wide-ranging eighth amendment analysis.
Thus, another import of this passage probably is that the lower courts
are not to engage in a greatly expanded proportionality analysis, and,
concomitantly, the passage indicates that affirmative defenses in the
context of serious criminality will not be disturbed except where a
statute removes from the definition of a crime those elements that
make it serious in the first place. 80 With respect to crimes of lesser
significance where the power to punish the offender severely is
not so clear, the Court may all~w, as lower courts have done on
their own initiative in regard to disproportionality of sentence, 81 a
more intensive judicial scrutiny of allocations of burdens.
Whether _my interpretation of Patterson is correct is uncertain,
burden of_ proof-to support its position, but it did acknowledge that such concerns
may influence a state's decision to allocate burdens. See 432 U.S. at 207. This
is consistent with the Court's uniform refusal to allow comparative convenience notions to influence its judgment on constitutional issues ever since the doctrine was
first articulated in Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). Justice White in Pat•
terson makes explicit reference to Morrison in a lengthy footnote, 432 U.S. at 203
n.9, but apparently only for the purpose of presenting authority permitting burdens
of proof to be placed on defendants. That he had no intention to rely on the com•
parative convenience aspects of Morrison to influence the decision in Patterson is evi•
dent from the concluding sentence of the footnote: "Of course, if the Morrison cases
are understood as approving shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving a fact
necessary to constitute the crime, the result in the first Morrison case [upholding
a burden shift to defendants] could not coexist with Winship and Mullaney."
The Court's avoidance of comparative convenience is well justified, for it is not
possible to discriminate between those circumstances that are encompassed by it
and those that are not. Compare, for example, proof of insanity to proof of provocation, and compare both of those to proof of intent. Finally, compare those three
to proof of renunciation or withdrawal. Thus, comparative convenience is one of
those theories that sounds good but cannot be rationally implemented.
79. 432 U.S. at 207-08.
80. As would be the case, for example, if the defense of entrapment or insanity
were viewed as negating intent. I also have serious difficulty with self-defense as
an affirmative defense, at least as an affirmative defense to a murder prosecution,
Compare Commonwealth v. Carbonetto, 455 Pa. 93, 314 A.2d 304 (1974), with State
v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504 (Me. 1971 ), and State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351
N.E.2d 88 (1976).
81. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288. (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded,
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of course. I realize that my argument may appear to give undue
weight to a small excerpt from the majority's opinion-after all,
Patterson makes no explicit reference to the eighth amendment or
to the proportionality doctrine. 82 But the Court's apparent reluctance to clarify its position in this area makes speculation necessary, and the proportionality doctrine is the most sensible explanation
of the federal interest in the reasonable doubt standard, especially
given the result in Patterson. Relating crime to its punishment and
viewing it from the perspective of the eighth amendment has a compelling logical force. In addition, the doctrine justifies federal intervention in an area long dominated by the states on the basis of a
clear constitutional command with relatively determinable limits that
adequately respect the states' traditional role in fashioning criminal
law policy. Finally, no other explanation of federal intervention can
be maintained unless the Court meant to forbid federal court intervention almost entirely. The Court is unmistakably disenchanted
with Mullaney v. Wilbur and quite possibly means to limit to ~gregious cases the involvement of federal courts in allocating burdens
under state law. This result, would, in effect, restore the state of
affairs that existed prior to the decision in Mullaney. Orily time
will tell whether the Court meant to restore the status quo ante
or whether it intended to stimulate development of more rigorous
eighth amendment standards.
ill.

VIEWING

Patterson

AS DISTINGUISHING,

RATHER THAN OVERRULING,

Mullaney

My treatment of Mullaney v. Wilbur has been based on the
423 U.S. 993 •(1975); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973); Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977).
82. The Court's failure to embrace the proportionality doctrine openly and enthusiastically is not surprising. Historically the Court has shown an inclination to
rely on the eighth amendment in only the extreme case. Thus, if the Court does
mean to tie the reasonable doubt standard to the eighth amendment, it will be entering largely uncharted waters. Accordingly, the Court may have chosen to proceed
cautiously and let the lower courts discover and chart the shoals that lie ahead. This
will allow an eighth amendment jurisprudence to develop with the Supreme Court
intervening when it feels it appropriate to do so. For an interesting discussion of
how the Court has allowed the lower courts to develop the jurisprudence in other
areas, see Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court,
86 YALB L.J. 1035 (1977).
The proportionality doctrine has already undergone substantial development. See
Allen, supra note 9, at 297-300. See also Carmona v. Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.
N.Y. 1977); People v. Stewart, 400 Mich. 540, 256 N.W.2d 31 (1977). There is
also a related area that may yield insights for proportionality analysis; a number
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conclusion that Patterson overruled Mullaney, and so indeed I think
it did. 83 A majority of the Court purported to see it otherwise,
however, and Justice White's opinion attempting to distinguish
Mullaney raises a number of questions about the motives of the
Court. As I see it, the answers to those questions make it clear that
the purported distinction yields no insights into the federal interest
in the reasonable doubt standard. However, the attempt to distinguish Mullaney is not without interest for reasons quite removed
from the burden-of-proof analysis of Patterson. In this section I
shall first demonstrate that the Maine statute struck down in Mullaney
is in no significant way different from the one upheld in Patterson,
thus indicating that the Court's distinction of Mullaney is untenable.
I shall then speculate on why the court acted as it did and conclude
with a brief discussion of the implications of the Court's treatment
of Mullaney.
In Mullaney, the Court invalidated a Maine statute placing the
burden on the defendant to prove heat of passion as a result of adequate provocation. In Patterson, the Court sustained a New York
statute placing the burden on the defendant to prove extreme emotional disturbance. Patterson must surely reject Mullaney's holding, 84 regardless of what the Court is willing to admit, unless there
is some distinction of constitutional magnitude between the two statutory schemes. One potential ground for differentiating the two
laws is the substantive character of the defenses they allow. New
York's concept of "extreme emotional disturbance," adopted from
the Model Penal Code, 85 is arguably broader than Maine's concept
of states permit review of the severity of a sentence. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW§§ 450.10, .30 (McKinney 197 1); Huff v. State, 568 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1977).
83. See, e.g., Farrell v. Czarnetzky, No. 76-2131 ·(2d Cir. Sept. 30, 1977), espe•
cially Oakes, J., concurring.
84. The Court in Mullaney stated: "We therefore hold that the Due Process
Clause requires the· prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of
the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in
a homicide case." 421 U.S. at 704.
85. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The
Code does not place the burden of proof on the defendant, however.
One of the reasons prompting the draftsmen of the Code to forgo common-law
terminology was the belief that the common law of provocation had become too narrow and too rigid and did not easily accommodate changing perceptions of what
should serve to mitigate the harshness of a murder prosecution. By reformulating
the test for mitigation, the draftsmen hoped to avoid arbitrary limitations on the principle and to "[sweep] away the rigid rules that have developed with respect to the
sufficiency of particular types of provocation." MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3, Commentary (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) at 46-47. For a discussion of the rigidity of the
common-law rules, see W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 472-82. The view
1
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of "heat of passion," and the New York law may provide better
notice of its provisions. Neither of these distinguishing features
supports a constitutional distinction, however.
Even if the New York courts interpret their statute broadly, 86
that hardly distinguishes it for constitutional purposes from the
Maine statute. The only effect of embracing a broader view is that
juries will be permitted to hear as evidence regarding mitigation a
number of provoking circumstances, viewed from the peculiar perspective of the defendant, that trial judges would not have permitted
juries to consider under the old provocation rubric. 87 But we have
long had great diversity in the administration of the various standards
of provocation that have developed in the various states, 88 and the
scope of the defense has always been thought to raise only questions
of policy. More particularly, there is no relationship, at least that
I can see, between the scope of the defense and who should bear
its burden of proof. The former goes to a state's view of what acts
under what conditions should be treated with leniency, and the latter
goes to how certain the state wishes to be of the existence of the
mitigating factors. The two are independent concerns, 89 which
of the draftsmen of the New York statute is found in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20,
Commentary at 393 (McKinney 1975).
Similarly, the draftsmen soughMo "qualify the rigorous objectivity of the prevailing law insofar as it judges the sufficiency of provocation by its effect on the reasonable man," MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 Commentary (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) at
47; see id. at 41, 48, by permitting an expanded inquiry into the peculiar attributes of
the man in the dock. Whereas before individual circumstances had been ignored,
the Code anticipated that they would be considered.
86. There are no thorough analyses of the issue in the New York cases. For
a general discussion, see People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 300-01, 347 N.E.2d 898,
906-07, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 581 (1976), affd., 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
87. As, for example, the old rule that words alone are never sufficient. See
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 201.3, Commentary (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) at 46-47.
88. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 574-79.
89. Placing the burden of production on the defendant would satisfy comparative
convenience considerations based on the possibly enhanced difficulty of administering
a broader statute. Apparently those considerations are not to aid constitutional analysis, however, see note 78 supra, and this area is another example of the good sense
of that conclusion. Even if the "extreme emotional disturbance" formulation has the
potential to be the broadest form of provocation, at what point does it become so
broad that it permits the burden of persuasion to be shifted to the defendant? Bear
in mind that the states have long administered defenses of varying scope, see W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 574-79, and, if comparative convenience were
to be a factor, a difficult-if not impossible-question of degree would have to be
resolved.
Moreover, the breadth of New York's statute is not altogether clear. The same
common-law process that resulted in the rigidification of the common law of provocation may result in a similar rigidification of New York's statutory defense, although
the dearth of cases on the subject may indicate that trial judges are letting about
everything "go to the jury." In this regard compare State v. Corbin, 15 Ore. App.
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probably explains the absence in Patterson of any reliance on the
scope of New York's defense to distinguish it from Maine's.
The other suggested distinction is more cogent than the issue of
scope, and it has some oblique support in certain language in Patterson. 00 The Court might have distinguished the laws of the two states
on the ground that New York's provided better notice of its provisions because the affirmative defense was spelled out in the statute,
whereas Maine's affirmative defense was a judicial gloss on the
homicide statute, which did not mention provocation at all. The Supreme Court, however, has never ruled that the due process vagueness doctrine requires the state to prescribe in a statute the contours
of a criminal offense, and the doctrine that a narrowing construction
may save an otherwise unconstitutionally vague law is authority to
the contrary. 91 One does not look, in short, to unadorned statutes
but to statutes as construed, and the cases construing Maine's lawat least the recent cases-left no doubt about the meaning of the
relevant provision. 92 Thus, the clarity of the statute and the requirement of notice do not distinguish Mullaney from Patterson
unless the Court was disavowing well-established principles of statutory construction of state law, and doing so in the most obscure
fashion. 93
The other potential ground for distinguishing between the New
York and Maine laws is the procedural ~ffect of the defense. Justice
White stood on this ground in arguing that Patterson differed from
Mullaney in that the Maine law created a statutory presumption
536,516 P.2d 1314 (1973), with Zebrowski v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 715, 1185 N.W.2d 545
(1971).
90. See 432 U.S. at 206-07.
91. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
It should also be noted that, in determining the meaning of a statute, "it is wellestablished that an authoritative construction by the State's highest court 'puts (appropriate) words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legislature.'" Patterson, 432 U.S. at 223 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) ). ·For a recent-and extreme-example of
this doctrine, see Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975). ·
92. The Maine statute did not mention provocation at all; rather, that defense had
resulted from a line of cases construing the statute. See Comment, supra note 11,
at 989-99.
93. Another factor that corroborates the small likelihood that the Court would
rely on the notice differential of the two statutes is that the "notice requirement"
is less a requirement of notice and more a means of reducing the risk of official abuse
created by a vague statute. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156 (1972). The ideal of actual notice is an appealing standard by which the risk
of discriminatory enforcement can be tested. A similar dynamic explains why cases
construing a statute are referred to in a vagueness inquiry even though no one, to
my knowledge, expects the man on the street to research-or be able to research. the precedents.
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whereas New York's involved a true affirmative defense. Thus, Justice White read Maine's homicide statute as making the absence of
provocation an elem~nt of murder, 94 and he reaffirmed the holding
of Mullaney that due process does not allow a state to shift "the burden of persuasion with respect to a fact which the State deems so
important that it must be either proved or presumed." 95 In contrast,
under the New York statute, "nothing was presumed or implied
against Patterson." 96 Consequently, in Justice White's view, New
York had proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of its
definition of murder.
Unfortunately the purported distinctions between presumptions
and affirmative defenses fail to sustain the contrasting outcomes of
Mullaney and Patterson. First, the Maine statute, as construed ]:>y
the Maine courts, did not set up a statutory presumption in the traditional sense. Justice White depicted Maine law as directing the trial
judge to instruct the jury that fact C, a necessary element of the ·offense, could be inferred from proof of facts A and B. 97 That, 'of
course, is not the case. Maine had not provided a rule of evidence
concerning inferential relationships; instead, it had placed the burden of proving provocation on the defendant, 98 precisely as New York
had done with extreme emotional disturbance. Indeed, if a few words
are changed, the description of Maine's statute fits New York's perfectly. The absence of extreme emotional disturbance is just as
much a "part of the definition of' murder in New York as provocation was in Maine. Moreover, New York "presumes" lack of extreme
emotional disturbance to the same· extent as did Maine. All it meant
in Maine to presume lack of provocation until the "presumption" was
"rebutted" by the defendant was that the defendant had the burden
of proving that he had been provoked. 99 That is precisely the situation in New York. Still, by characterizing Mullaney as a statutory
94. 432 U.S. at 215. The Maine statute defining murder, see note 14 supra,
did not refer to provocation. However, the instructions given by the Maine trial
court emphasized that "malice aforethought," which is mentioned in the Maine statute, is inconsistent with the "heat of passion on sudden provocation." Mullaney, 421
U.S. at 686-87; Patterson, 432 U.S. at 213. It was for this reason_ that the majority
in Patterson asserted that lack of provocation was an element of murder under the
statute.
95. 432 U.S. at 215.
96. 432 U.S. at 216.
97. See 432 U.S. at 215-16.
98. See 432 U.S. at 212-16.
99. State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973); State v. Rollins, 295 A.2d 914
(Me. 1972); State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971).
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presumption case, the Court could assert that it had no impact on
garden-variety affirmative defenses where no inferential process is
involved. This analysis allowed the Court to reach the opposite
conclusion in Patterson than it reached in Mullaney without having
to overrule the earlier case. 100
But even apart from this skewed interpretation of Maine law, the
distinction between a true affirmative defense and a presumption
lacks constitutional significance. "Presumption" means many different things in our legal system,101 but for purposes of the issues under
100. It is inconceivable that Justice White did not know exactly what he was
doing. A year before he wrote for the Court in Patterson, Justice White wrote for
a unanimous Court in Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976), a case that has striking similarities to the common problem of Mullaney and Patterson. In Lavine, the
Court considered the_ constitutionality of a statute that "deemed" a person applying
for, welfare within 75 days after voluntarily terminating his employment or reducing
his earning capacity to have done so "for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance
or a larger amount thereof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary supplied by
such person." N.Y. Soc. SERV. I.Aw § 131(11) (McKinney Supp. 1975). Consider
the following portion of Justice White's opinion:
Although the District Court found this [provision] to be an unconstitutional
"rebuttable presumption," the sole purpose of the provision is to indicate that,
as with other eligibility requirements, the applicant rather than the State must
J:Stablish that he did not leave employment for the purpose of qualifying for
'benefits. The provision carries with it no procedural consequence; it shifts to
the applicant neither the burden of going forward nor the burden of proof, for
he appears to carry the burden from the outset.
The offending sentence could be interpreted as a rather circumlocutory
direction to welfare authorities to employ a standardized inference that if the
Home Relief applicant supplies no information on the issue, he will be presumed
to have quit his job to obtain welfare benefits. However, such an instruction
would be superfluous for the obvious reason that the failure of an applicant
to prove an essential element of eligibility will always result in the denial of
benefits, much as the failure of a tort or contract plaintiff to prove an essential
element of his case will always result in a nonsuit. The only "rebuttable
presumption"-if, indeed, it can be so called-at work here is the normal
assumption that an applicant is not entitled to benefits unless and until he proves
his eligibility.
Despite the rebuttable presumption aura that the second sentence of §
131(11) radiates, it merely makes absolutely clear the fact that the applicant
bears the burden of proof on this issue, as he does on all others. And since
appellees do not object to the substantive requirement that Home Relief apJ?Ii•
cants must be free of the impermissible benefit-seeking motive, their underlymg
complaint may be that the burden of proof on this issue has been unfairly placed
on welfare applicants rather than on the State.
424 U.S. at 583-85 (footnote omitted).
However "circumlocutory" the Maine statute and cases involved in Mullaney,
they "merely [made] absolutely clear the fact that the [defendant] bears the burden of
proof on [the] issue" of provocation. By demonstrating the Court's competence to
see through the form of a statute to its substance, Lavine seems to force the conclusion that the only explanation of Patterson is that the Court wished to reject the
principle of Mullaney. In fact, Lavine is not an aberration; the Court has long
recognized that states have often used the word "presumption" and its derivatives in
a very loose way. See Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 418 (1928), recognizing
that "there are presumptions that are not evidence in a proper sense but simply regulations of the burden of proof."
101. See generally D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 950-1009 (3d ed. 1976); Soules, Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 20
BAYLOR L. REV. 277 (1968).
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consideration in Mullaney and Patterson it refers to an evidentiary
rule directing the court to instruct the factfinder that it may infer
the establishment of one fact from the establishment of another. 102
The presumption rests on a determination by the courts or the legislature that experience demonstrates the validity of the inference
even though a jury of laymen is unlikely to be aware of it. Thus,
the presumption cures a gap in the jury's knowledge that otherwise
could be remedied only by presenting in every case the evidence
for the validity of the inference.
Presumptions were originally devised by judges through the
common law, but in the past century legislatures have displaced the
courts in this area, and statutory presumptions designed to serve the
same instructional needs have proliferated. 103 The Supreme Court
has wrestled with the constitutional problems of statutory presumptions in a long line of cases. 104 What has proved troublesome to
the Court is that Congress has on occasion created statutory presumptions providing for the inference of a necessary element even
though the evidence of a significant correlation between the proved
facts and the faot inferred is inconclusive. 105 The Court has struck
down these inadequately founded presumptions as violative of due
process. 106
102. One example is the ancient rule that unexplained possession of stolen goods
justifies the inference that the person in possession knew the property had been
stolen. In prosecutions for knowing possession of stolen goods, juries are often informed of this permissible inference through an instruction. See, e.g., Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
103. As the government stated in its brief in United States v. Gainey: "All that
Congress has done, in effect, is to substitute for judge-made law its statutory views
of what inferences are normally permissible." Brief for Appellant at 15, United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965). There may be a question whether judges, at
least federal judges, will be permitted to engage in this lawmaking process in the future. Cf. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n.11 (1973) ("[w]e do not decide today whether a judge-formulated inference of less antiquity may properly be
emphasized by a jury instruction"). The Supreme Court recently dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question a state case upholding a statutory inference. Hamilton v. Florida, 329 So. 2d 283 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 909 (1976).
104. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); United States v. Gainey,
380 'U.S. 63 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Ferry v. Ramsey,
277 U.S. 88 (1928).
Somewhat similar problems have arisen with respect to mandatory presumptions
in civil cases, see, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 385 U.S. 312 (1931), although such presumptions are now viewed as problems distinct from presumptions in criminal cases.
See generally Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
761 (1977); Gordon & Tenenbaum, Conclusive Presumption Analysis: The Principle
of Individual Opportunity, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 579 (1976).
105. Relying on the legislature's superior factfinding powers is not inconsistent
with recognizing that the legislature may occasionally err and that courts should
rectify the errors.
106. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970). The Co_urt has
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Statutory presumptions and affirmative defenses operate in a
similar fashion, as Patterson and Mullaney (as misconstrued by the
Court) make clear. A state could, as New York did, define murder
as intent and causation and further provide for the affirmative defense of provocation. 107 A state could just as easily conclude, as the
Court did in misinterpreting Maine's law, that lack of provocation
should be an element of murder but further conclude that lack of provocation can be inferred from intent and causation. Justice White apparently feels that presumptions and affirmative defenses require
different constitutional treatment and that a presumption may be invalid where the comparable affirmative defense is permitted. But,
if anything, presumptions should receive lesser scrutiny, for they are
more favorable to the defendant than are affirmative defenses since
the former shift only the burden of production whereas -the latter
shift the burden of persuasion. With a statutory presumption, all
the defendant must do to rebut it is create a reasonable doubt about
the issue. Were the state to replace the presumption with an affirmative defense, the defendant would have to prove the affirmative
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Even where the defendant can offer no evidence on his behalf, he is better off under
a presumption, since the jury may simply decline to draw the inference.108 When this defendant must establish an affirmative denever resolved what the relationship must be between the proven and the inferred
fact. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 149. As LaFave and Scott point
out, however, "it now appears that the Court is testing statutory presumptions by the
•.. beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test." Id. There is language in Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), which suggests that the Court has reacl)ed this conclusion: "In Mullaney v. 'Wilbur, as in In re Winship, the Court held that due process requires the States in some circumstances to apply the reasonable-doubt standard
of proof rather than some lesser standard." 432 U.S. at 242. The Court would
not have· reached the issue of standard of proof demanded of statutory presumptions
in Mullaney even if the Court had treated it as a statutory presumption case since
Maine placed the persuasion burden on the defendant and this fact alone would invalidate the Maine law.
Not every inference used by the prosecutor in a criminal trial need satisfy the
reasonable doubt standard, as proof by circumstantial evidence demonstrates. The
reason advanced for requiring such a high standard when the prosecutor relies on
a statutory presumption is that the jury will be instructed on the inference, and the
instruction may have a very great impact on the jury. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219, 237 (1911); Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling
the Practical with the Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 157, 160 ('1970). See also
Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases:
A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 198-99 (1969).
107. I am here using "provocation" as synonymous with "extreme emotional disturbance."
108. The traditional instruction for informing the jury of a statutory presumption
tells the jury that it may, but is not compelled, to draw the inference. W. LAFAVB
& A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 147-48.
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fense, however, the jury can bail him out only by taking the more
drastic measure of jury nullification. 109 Thus, by requiring a higher
standard of proof, affirmative defenses leave a defendant materially
worse off than do presumptions. Accordingly, presumptions should
be given less rather than more intense scrutiny by the courts.11° Furthermore, the proportionality doctrine should apply to presumptions as well as to affirmative defenses. If the punishment
provided is not disproportionate in light -of the facts established by
the state beyond a reasonable doubt, the ·use of an inference, however
tenuous, to "establish" an additional fact should not impair the
constitutionality of the statute defining the offense. 111 Of course,
if the inferred fact is essential to justify the prescribed punishment,
the presumption must satisfy the due process test developed in the
statutory presumption cases. The point is that this test is called for
only if a prior eighth amendment analysis concludes that the fact in
issue is a necessary part of the prosecution's case.
The attempt to distinguish between the procedural practice of
the Maine and New York law on provocation thus fails on a number
of counts. First, it is entirely inapposite, since Maine law did not
create a presumption. But, beyond that, it is analytically defective.
As Patterson shows, the distinction is constitutionally significant only
if one accepts the elements theory;112 Justice White c()ntended, in
essence, that the distinction between the Maine and New York laws.
was that absence of provocation was an element of one but not the
other. 113 In addition, the distinction creates the anomalous result
that the state can, in certain instances, shift to the defendant the persuasion burden with respect to a "nonessential" element but cannot
take the less drastic course of shifting the production burden. 114
109. In contrast to the prerogative to decline an inference, juries are traditionally
not alerted to their power to nullify. See, e.g., United States·v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
110. Scrutiny of presumptions is also required where improper instructions may
confuse the jury by giving the impression that the presumption shifts the burden of
persuasion. Where this occurs, the court need only review the instructions in light of
the underlying statute and determine whether they meet the minimum standard of
clarity. Poorly worded instructions should not be grounds for invalidating an otherwise constitutional statute.
111. This treatment of statutory presumptions is compatible with the concern for
rationality in the criminal process. See note 60 infra. I am suggesting simply that
for purposes of constitutional analysis statutory presumptions should be viewed as
modified affirmative defenses.
112. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the elements test, see text at notes
68-74 supra.
113. See text at notes 94-96 supra.
114. Perhaps the Mullaney-Patterson distinction can be rationalized on the ground
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One wonders why the Court struggled to construct such
a spurious distinction. The most plausible explanation of the Court's
behavior is that the Court recognized that it had erred in Mullaney
and wished to rectify its mistake. Unfortunately, Mullaney was only
two years old, and, to complicate matters, the decision was unanimous. These factors, plus a natural reluctance to confess error, no
doubt sent the Court down the path it took. The only way the Court
could simultaneously reject the reasoning of Mullaney without overruling it was to write a revisionist history of the case and adopt an
insupportable distinction between affirmative defenses and presumptions.
It is unfortunate, in any event, that the Court lacked the candor
to overrule Mullaney explicitly. It is unfortunate because Mullaney
will likely linger on rather than die the quiet death it deserves. Although I doubt that Mullaney will now be employed to invalidate
affirmative defenses, 115 the case may come to stand for a rule of statutory construction that not only has little to commend it but also has
a significant potential for misapplication. The rule might emerge
that if a criminal statute speaks in terms either of an implied element
or of presumption that must be rebutted, the courts will be warranted in concluding that the fact "implied" or "presumed" is an "essential element" of the crime, and thus part of the state's case. 110
Consequently, the statute will be analyzed from the perspective of

a

that the intention of a legislature to impose a burden of persuasion on the defendartt
must be clearly articulated. This would require the states to employ the correct language in their statutes, which, I suppose, would be no great hardship. Cf. Bickel & •
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957) (the Supreme Court is sometimes justified in "remanding" a statute to Congress to ensure that Congress meant what the statute seems to
be saying).
115. Ironically, on the same day it decided Patterson, the Court ruled that Mullaney had retroactive application. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233
(1977). Significantly, the Court in Hankerson reserved the question whether due
process allows the state to make self-defense an affirmative defense to murder. 432
U.S. at 245.
116. It is likely, but not certain, that the Court will persevere in imposing upon
the states the distinction between statutory presumptions and affirmative defenses.
Except for Mullaney, as interpreted by Patterson, the Court has never applied its
more recent statutory presumption analysis to the states. While Patterson may
herald a shift in this policy, quite possibly the Court will announce at some later
date that Patterson overruled Mullaney, thereby aborting further development in this
direction. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP.
Cr. REV. 211. Such an announcement would, by the way, be consistent with other
Supreme Court forays into the states' substantive criminal law. The Court has on
occasion made overtures to the effect that it would begin to consider various aspects
of the substantive criminal law and then failed to come forth with serious development. In this regard Mullaney and Patterson resemble the journey from Robinson
v. _California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), to Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). For
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statutory presumptions rather than affirmative defenses. 117 Not only
might such a rule induce a court to repeat Patterson's erroneous construotion of state law, but, by resurrecting the elements theory, it
would make the constitutionality of a statute turn on semantics, and
"[t]he reason for attaching constitutional significance to a semantic
difference is [as] difficult to discern" in this area as it is in others. 118

IV.

A

FINAL THOUGHT

The Supreme Court's treatment of burdens of proof in the last
seven years has been, in many respects, a disturbing chapter in constitutional jurisprudence. Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson are characterized by misguided or misleading analysis, and although the Court
reached correct results in the first and last cases, its modus operandi
reflects poorly on the Court. Mullaney extended Winship's due process theory further than careful analysis could sustain, in no small part
because of some incautious language in Winship. Patterson restored
Winship to its proper station by tacitly acknowledging, at least if my
reading is correct, that the validity of an affirmative defense is governed by the eighth amendment's proportionality doctrine rather
than by ithe due process analysis proposed in Winship. Patterson did,
however, leave open the possibility of further confusion by suggesting that Mullaney was correctly decided insofar as it differentiated
between affirmative defenses and statutory presumptions. The
irony of such an outcome is unmistakable, as Mullaney avowedly
repudiated the concept that the validity of an affirmative defense
rested on how the state chose to define an offense. One may hope
that the Court will have an opportunity in the near future to resolve
the remaining doubts about its position.

a related point that also raises doubts as to whether statutory presumption analysis
will be imposed on the states, see Allen, supra note 9, at 287 n.97.
The states have generally felt bound by the Court's statutory presumption analysis. See, e.g., People v. McClendon, 188 Colo. 140, 533 P.2d 923 (1975); State
v. Searle, - La.-, 339 So. 2d 11194 (1976).
117. In a situation where it is not clear whether a state meant to create an affirmative defense, where the eighth amendment analysis may be very difficult, and
where statutory prest1mption analysis may be much simpler to apply, a court would
be justified in resolving doubts in favor of statutory presumption analysis, assuming
that the Mullaney-Patterson distinction is maintained. This approach would permit
the court to postpone the more difficult constitutional question and would not prohibit the state from replacing the presumption with an affirmative defense, should it
choose to do so.
118. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).

